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ARGUMENT
A.
NATIONWIDE'S "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE IS CONTRARY TO
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-10
At Point II of Respondent Nationwide!s Brief/ beginning
at page 8/ Nationwide argues that its "Other Insurance" clause is
valid "unless contrary to statute or public policy".

Appellant

respectfully submits that the Other Insurance clause is in fact
contrary to U.C.A. § 31-41-10/ which was in effect at the time of
the accident giving rise to appellant's claim.

As was argued in

Appellant's Opening Brief/ § 31-41-10 sets forth specifically the
only circumstances under which an insurer may exclude its insured
from receiving personal injury protection benefits.

Farmers Ins.

Exchange v. Call/ Utah, 712 P.2d 231 (1985).
Nationwide1s characterization of its Other Insurance
clause as "a limitation on the benefits available" (Respondent's
Brief/ p. 9) rather than an exclusion is an attempt to exhalt
form over substance.

If the legislature wanted to permit

insurers to exclude coverage to insureds who had received some,
but less than complete/ compensation for their medical bills from
another insurance carrier/ it could have easily added another
subdivision to § 31-41-10.

It is significant to note that upon

amendment of the Insurance Code in 1986/ the legislature
specifically sanctioned prorating of liability coverage [U.C.A. §
31A-22-303(2)(a)] and specifically prohibited stacking of
uninsured motorist coverage [U.C.A. § 3lA-22-305(6)] but left the
language of § 31-41-10 intact at § 31A-22-309(2).
1

B.
NATIONWIDE S RELIANCE ON MARTIN V. CHRISTENSEN, AN UNINSURED
f

MOTORIST CASE, IS NOT PERSUASIVE
Nationwide argues that because, even prior to the
enactment of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, this
court upheld the validity of an "other insurance" clause in a
case involving an insured who wished to stack uninsured motorist
benefits [Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294
(1969)], it should do likewise in the instant case involving an
insured who wishes to stack PIP benefits.

Martin involved an

attempt by a driver to stack uninsured motorist benefits from two
policies issued by the same insurer on the same vehicle.

The

policy provision which the court considered stated, "With respect
to any occurrence, accident or loss to which this and any other
insurance policy or policies issued to the insured by the company
also apply, no payment shall be made hereunder which . . . would
result in a total payment . . .

in excess of the highest

applicable limit of liability under any one such policy."

This

court held that "there is nothing in the [uninsured motorist]
statute which would prevent an insurer, in issuing a second
policy, from limiting its coverage to the statutory requirement.
At page 13 of her Opening Brief, appellant pointed out that one
of the three categories of cases where courts have prohibited
"stacking" is where "an insured tried to make a claim on multiple
vehicles insured under one policy or by a single insurer".
Martin is such a case.
Closer to the point is Thamert v. Continental Cas. Co.,
Utah, 621 P.2d 706 (1980), also an uninsured motorist coverage
2

case/ where the Court held void a policy provision providing for
a set off from uninsured motorist benefits for any amounts
received pursuant to workmen's compensation laws.

This court

held that any insurance policy attempt to reduce the amounts
payable below that specified in the uninsured motorist statute
would be contrary to the statute.

Similarly/ in the instant

case/ despite the language of U.C.A. § 31-41-7 providing for
possible "excess" coverage and priority of payment/ Nationwide
seeks to set off the payment received by Vickie Crowther from
another insurance company against the coverage it is statutorily
bound to provide and for which it accepted premium payments.
The grounds upon which the courts in some states have
upheld prohibitions against "stacking" in the uninsured motorist
context is to prevent the insured from being financially better
off when he is injured by an uninsured motorist than he would be
had he been injured by a properly insured motorist.

One who is

injured by an insured motorist has only the tortfeasor's insurer
to look to for recovery.

One who is injured by an uninsured

motorist who happens to have two policies covering the same
vehicle/ as was the case in Martin v. Christensen/ supra/ can
theoretically double his recovery by "stacking" benefits from the
two policies.

This court has expressed that concern.

See,

Lyon

v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co./ Utah, 480 P.2d 739
(1971)/ overruled on other grounds at 701 P.2d 798.

In the

instant no-fault benefit dispute, Vickie Crowther has incurred
more medical bills than the sum of the limits of the two policies
providing PIP medical benefits.
3

Regardless of whether she is

paid by one or both of the insurers/ she is not entitled to claim
those same benefits in a personal injury lawsuit against the
driver who struck her,

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie/ Utah, 606 P.2d

1197 (1980).
Also distinguishable are those foreign jurisdiction
cases discussed in Nationwide f s brief.

In Rana v. Bishop Ins. of

Hawaii/ Inc./ Haw./ 713 P.2d 1363 (1985)/ Rana sought to stack
no-fault insurance earning loss coverage on seven different
automobiles owned by him and used in his taxicab business/ each
of which was insured by Bishop.

He sought benefits of $800 per

month up to his actual earnings loss of $2/000 per month.

One

provision of the Hawaii no-fault scheme/ HRS § 294-3(c)/ provided
in part as follows:

"'Maximum limit.1

benefits payable per person . . .

The total no-fault

on account of accidental harm

sustained by him in any one motor vehicle accident shall be
$15/000/ regardless of the number of motor vehicles involved or
policies applicable".

Another provision, HRS § 294-2(10)/

provided/ "fNo-fault benefits' with respect to any accidental
harm shall be subject to an aggregate limit of $15/000 per person
. . .."

The insurer had paid Rama $800 per month and had

terminated payments at $15/000.

In view of the statutes quoted

above, the Hawaii court had no trouble concluding that "Based on
the plain and unambiguous language in HRS §§ 294-2(10) and -3(c) ;
buttressed by the statute's legislative history, we construe the
No-Fault Law to preclude stacking." (713 P.2d at 1367)

The Utah

No-Fault Act, on the other hand, contains no similar "maximum
limit".

4

Kirsch v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 532 F. Supp. 766 (W.D.
Pa. 1982)/ discussed in Nationwidefs brief beginning at page 19/
involved an attempt to stack work loss benefits where the insured
had a single policy issued by Nationwide insuring two vehicles.
The insured wished to stack work loss benefits under both
vehicles and thus receive up to $30/000 in work loss benefits
despite a statutory $15/000 ceiling on receipt of such benefits.
It is not at all clear that the same result would have been
reached had the insured attempted to stack medical benefits.
See, Antanovich v. Allstate Ins. Co./ Pa., 488 A.2d 571 (1985),
which points out the Pennsylvania no-fault "Act's distinction
between unlimited recovery under Sections 103 and 202(a) for
allowable medical expense and the limited recovery under Section
202(b) for basic work loss".

(488 A.2d at 575)

On the other

hand, the Utah No-Fault Act discusses minimum benefits which must
be provided under each motor vehicle policy issued in Utah
(U.C.A. § 31-41-6) but, as previously stated, nowhere discusses
maximum benefits payable.
Equally distinguishable is Davis v. Hughes, Kan., 622
P.2d 641 (1981), discussed in Nationwidefs brief at page 21.

In

Davis, plaintiff was injured in an accident involving her own
vehicle in which she was a passenger.
driven by her husband.

The vehicle was being

She sought to stack PIP benefits and

uninsured motorist benefits from the policy describing her
vehicle and from a policy describing a vehicle owned by her sonin-law, in whose home she resided.

The Kansas Supreme Court

first observed that "This court has previously held uninsured
5

motorist coverage in two policies may be stacked up to the full
amount of damages sustained" (622 P.2d at 648)/ and concluded it
was proper to permit the stacking of uninsured motorist coverages
from the two policies.

The court then turned to the issue of

stacking PIP benefits and looked to a Kansas statute/ K.S.A. 1979
Supp. 40-3108/ which provided that "Any insurer may exclude [PIP]
benefits . . . (a) for injury sustained by the named insured and
relatives residing in the same household while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by the named insured and not insured under
the policy . . .."

The policy issued to plaintiff's son-in-law

contained such an exclusion.

In view of the fact that plaintiff/

by virtue of being a relative residing in the same household as
her son-in-law/ was an insured under the son-in-law1s policy and
was injured in a vehicle owned by her but not described in the
son-in-law's policy/ the court/ quoting from McNemee v. Farmers
Insurance Group/ Kan./ 612 P.2d 645 (1980)/ concluded as follows:
"The question in this case is whether 'stacking' of PIP
medical benefits is permitted. We hold that it is not. Any
insurer may exclude benefits required by the Kansas
Automobile Injury Reparation Act: For injury sustained by
the named insured and relatives residing in the same
household while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the
named insured and not insured under the policy . . . .
When/
as in the present case/ the exclusion has been inserted in a
PIP endorsement/ the exclusion is binding on the parties.
The exclusion is authorized by statute and governs the
extent of personal injury protection benefits recoverable
when inserted in an insurance contract." (622 P.2d at 649)
(emphasis added)
The policy exclusion relied on by the Kansas court to
prohibit plaintiff in Davis from stacking benefits was an
exclusion permitted by statute—the same exclusion permitted
insurers in Utah by U.C.A. § 31-41-10(a)(i).
6

The Davis case is

not/ as Nationwide would imply/ authority that every policy
exclusion or limitation serving to prevent stacking of benefits
is enforceable.

The exclusion advanced by the insurer in Davis

was permitted by statute.

The exclusion from coverage set forth

in Nationwide!s Other Insurance clause/ whether labeled an
"exclusion" or a "limitation"/ is not one specified in U.C.A. §
31-41-10.
The one case which has been cited to the court which
considered the effect of an "other insurance" clause in the
context of an effort to stack no-fault benefits is Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Lopez/ Nev./ 567 P.2d 471 (1977).

In that case Lopez

sustained injury when his automobile collided with that of an
uninsured motorist.

His automobile was covered under two

separate policies/ each containing no-fault coverage.

His

medical bills exceeded the limits of medical benefits available
under the combined limits of both policies.
paid its limits.

One of the insurers

The other. Travelers, refused to pay relying in

part on the "other insurance" clause in its policy.

The Nevada

Supreme Court noted that the original reason for "other
insurance" clauses—to prevent overinsurance and double recovery
under property and fire insurance policies—was of limited
importance under an automobile liability policy and that "If
there ever was a strong rationale for the use of

f

other

insurance1 clauses it has, on facts such as those presently
before us, substantially evaporated". (567 P.2d at 475)

The

court construed the "other insurance" clause to mean "that the
insured shall not collect twice for the same medical bills" (567
7

P.2d at 474) and held that "the better view favors respondent's
position that an insured is entitled to payment in full up to the
policy limit/ with respect to each policy under which coverage is
afforded/ and that

f

other insurance1 clauses and similar clauses

which purport to limit liability are void".

Id.

C.
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL BENEFITS FROM NATIONWIDE
IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE
UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT
Appellant acknowledges that when enacted the purpose of
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act was to "stabilize/ if
not effectuate certain savings in/ the rising costs of automobile
accident insurance"-

U.C.A. § 31-41-2.

Vickie Crowther is only

attempting to be indemnified from as many of the medical bills
she incurred as a result of her accident as policy limits will
permit.

She is not seeking payment of benefits in excess of the

limits of the policy on which she paid premiums.

In no event is

she going to recive full indemnification for her medical bills
through receipt of PIP benefits; payment of benefits by
Nationwide will not result in receipt of duplicative benefits.
Appellant submits that requiring Nationwide to pay benefits for
which it accepted a premium/ when the clear language of U.C.A. §
31-41-7(2) contemplates possible payment under more than one
policy/ "including those complying with this act"/ will do
nothing to thwart the legislature's intentions.
1. Appellant wishes to note/ for whatever significance it may
have/ the absence of a "purpose" statute in that portion of the
new Insurance Code 7 Title 31A, Chapter 22/ Part III/ dealing with
motor vehicle insurance.

8

D.
SHOULD SHE PREVAIL ON THIS APPEAL,
FARMERS INS. EXCHANGE V. CALL OUGHT NOT PRECLUDE
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO APPELLANT
In its brief. Nationwide argues that Farmers Ins.
Exchange v. Call/ Utah, 712 P.2d 231 (1985)/ precludes an award
of attorney fees to Vickie Crowther because there is no evidence
that Nationwide acted in bad faith in denying benefits.
opinion in

The

Farmers Ins. Exchange fails to take into account the

language or purpose of U.C.A. § 31-41-8/ reenacted in
substantially unchanged form at U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(5).
Farmers Ins. Exchange/ quoting from American States
Insurance Co. v. Walker/ 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971),
does state as follows:
"Before an award of attorney's fees [can] be made in
the declaratory judgment action/ it must appear that the
insurance company acted in bad faith or fraudulently or was
stubbornly litigious." . . . The defendant has not
demonstrated that this litigation was not brought in good
faith.
When faced with a decision as to whether to defend or
refuse to defend/ an insurer is entitled to seek a
declaratory judgment as to its obligations and rights.
[citation] An award of attorney fees is not warranted
'where the plaintiff merely stated its position and
initiated this action for determination of what appears to
be a justiciable controversy1 Western Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Marchant/ Utah, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (1980)."
(emphasis
added)
Contrary to the Farmers Ins. Exchange, American States
Insurance Co./ and Western Casualty & Surety Co. cases/
Nationwide did not bring a declaratory judgment action in order
to have its rights and obligations judicially determined.
Instead/ Nationwide simply denied coverage (R. 48) and placed the
onus on Mrs. Crowther to seek judicial relief.
9

Appellant does

not contend that failure to file a declaratory judgment action in
and of itself constitutes bad faith.

Nor does appellant claim

that Nationwide has in any way exhibited bad faith.

Appellant

does submit that Nationwide f s wrongful denial of benefits, when
coupled with its failure to seek declaratory relief, justify
imposition of attorney fees upon no greater degree of culpability
than its mistake as to the law resulting in detriment to its
insured.

Assuming Vickie Crowther prevails on this appeal, the

question should be:

"If an insurer guesses wrong as to whether

coverage to its insured is available, who is to bear the burden
of the insured1s attorney fees so as to enable the insured to
recoup 100% of the benefits to which she was entitled?

Appellant

respectfully submits that to ask the question is to answer it.
If Vickie Crowther prevails on this appeal, whether her attorney
is being paid on an hourly basis, pursuant to a percentage
contingent fee, or on a flat rate basis, she will not net the
$2,000 to which she submits she was entitled unless she is also
awarded attorney fees.
If the Farmers Ins. Exchange holding on attorney fees
cannot be distinguished on the basis that Farmers took the
initiative of filing a declaratory relief action, then this court
should overrule the attorney fee holding in Farmers.

If a

finding of bad faith is required before an insured becomes
entitled to attorney fees from her insurer based upon nonpayment
of no-fault benefits, the last sentence of U.C.A. § 31-41-8 would
be legislative surplusage.

A prevailing litigant can claim

attorney fees in every case in which the opposing party brings an
action or asserts a defense in bad faith.
10

U.C.A. § 78-27-56.

CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that a review of the new Insurance
Code, Utah Code Ann. Title 31A/ shows a clear legislative intent
to distinguish between the permissable exclusions, limitations
and conditions allowed an insurer providing no-fault benefits,
and those allowed an insurer providing liability or uninsured
motorist benefits.
Nationwidefs "Other Insurance" clause is a limitation
to coverage not permitted by U.C.A. § 31-41-10 and/ as applied to
Vickie Crowther/ should be held void.
Appellant respectfully submits that the Order (summary
judgment) entered by the District Court should be reversed and
that summary judgment should be entered in her favor and against
respondent Nationwide for $2/000 together with interest/ costs/
and reasonable attorney fees.

The action should be remanded to

the District Court for determination of the appropriate amount of
attorney fees.
Dated:

November

1986.

yy*^
STEVEN H. LYBBBRT
Attorney for Appellant
Vickie D. Crowther
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the /'7A day of November, 1986, I
hand delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply
Brief to John R. Lund, Esq., attorney for respondent, at 10
Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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